Communications Privacy in the Digital Age
June 1997
Interim Report:
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Prepared by the Electronic Surveillance
Task Force
OF THE DIGITAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY WORKING GROUP
Table of Contents
Introduction
Summary of Conclusions
- Electronic Surveillance Must Be Subject to Strong Privacy Protections
- II. Technological Changes Affect Privacy, Security and Law Enforcement, Posing Challenges and Offering Opportunities
- Five Key Developments
- Rapid expansion of wireless services
- Dramatic development of the Internet
- Traffic analysis provides increasingly rich source of personal information
- Control over technology has shifted
- Globalization
- Developments since 1986 require a strengthening of ECPA
- Changes in Technology Exacerbate the Constitutional Vulnerability of Records Held by Third Parties, Requiring a New Look at the Fourth Amendment-Based Rules on Government Access
Technological Advancements in Surveillance
- Wireless services
- Location information
- E-mail and other on-line communications
- Remote monitoring
- Computer analysis
Government Efforts to Expand Surveillance Capabilities: CALEA Implementation
- CALEA Was Premised on the Effective Enforcement of Strict Privacy Protections
- Development of the CALEA Legislation
- Law Enforcement Is Able to Take Advantage of All Advances in Technology
- CALEA Implementation Issues
- Expansion of Surveillance Capabilities
- Location Information
- Capacity Requirements
- Funding
- Public Accountability
- Compliance Deadlines and Reimbursement
- Privacy and Security
- CALEA Coverage
Government Efforts to Control Encryption Technology
Protecting Wireless Communications
Amending the Wiretap Laws
- Excusing Violations of the Wiretap Laws
- Roving Wiretaps
- Emergency Wiretaps
- Review of FISA
International Issues
Notes
The ongoing worldwide revolution in communications
technology is fundamentally changing the way people conduct their
business and private lives. These changes are producing challenges
for privacy, communications security and law enforcement (and
national security) and are stretching the limits of existing legal
rules. Striking the proper balance among privacy, security and
law enforcement interests in the electronic realm has always been
a complex endeavor. Rapid changes in communications technology
require the periodic reexamination of privacy and communications
security protections and law enforcement capabilities. It is time
again for such a review.
The Digital Privacy and Security Working
Group is a diverse forum of over 50 computer, communications,
and public interest organizations working to develop and implement
policies that protect personal privacy and network security on
the expanding and rapidly changing global information infrastructure.
(DPSWG membership is listed in Appendix A.) Originally formed
in 1986, the DPSWG has played a critical role on several major
communications privacy and security issues, including the enactment
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"),
the effort to ensure that legislation adopted in 1994 to preserve
law enforcement access to communications (the Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act, "CALEA") included privacy protections
and public accountability mechanisms and was narrowly tailored
so as not to impede the deployment of new technology, and the
on-going debate over government control of encryption.
This report addresses the privacy and security
issues raised by new communications and computer technologies
and the needs of law enforcement. The report is "interim"
because the technologies themselves continue to change so rapidly,
because Administration policy continues to develop, and because
a number of the issues merit further study or more detailed exposition.
The report's structure is as follows: Section
I summarizes briefly the federal wiretap laws. Sections II and
III address some of the broad implications for privacy, security,
and law enforcement of ongoing developments in communications
technology, including the dramatic growth of the Internet and
wireless communications. Sections IV through VIII address specific
issues: implementation of CALEA (Section IV); government efforts
to control encryption (Section V); protection of wireless communications
(Section VI); revisions, including those sought by the Administration,
in the laws governing wiretaps, pen registers and trap and trace
devices (Section VII); and emerging issues concerning law enforcement
cooperation and privacy protection in the international arena
(Section VIII).
In preparing this report, we recognized
the importance of the law enforcement interests at stake. Members
of the surveillance task force met with representatives of the
Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
In all of our recommendations, we sought to be responsive to law
enforcement's legitimate needs.
The focus of this report is limited to questions
involving government access to communications and stored electronic
data. The report does not address the important questions that
concern the relationships between employers and employees or between
businesses and customers.
The report was prepared by the DPSWG electronic
surveillance task force, including James X. Dempsey and Jerry
Berman, co-chairs; Joel Bernstein; Emilio Cividanes; Geoff Feiss;
Wallace Henderson; Kate Martin; Lynn McNulty; and Ronald Plesser.
Drafts of this report were made available
to all DPSWG member companies and organizations. A number of DPSWG
members made comments, all of which were incorporated. However,
not all members of DPSWG share all the views and concerns expressed
in the report.
The report has been endorsed by the following
organizations, representing a broad cross-section of DPSWG:
Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
Center for Democracy and Technology
Center for National Security Studies
Commercial Internet eXchange Association
Competitive Telecommunications Association
Electronic Messaging Association
United States Telephone Association
Electronic Communications Privacy
Communications privacy is a bedrock constitutional
principle, and electronic communications must be protected through
strong privacy legislation implement-ing the Fourth Amendment's
requirements. As technologies evolve, it is periodically necessary
to review the effectiveness of statutory privacy protections.
Such a review should consider the overall balance between the
technical and legal capabilities of government and the technical
and legal status of privacy and com-munications security protections.
Piecemeal amendments to the surveillance laws in response only
to government concerns will inappropriately upset the balance.
New Communications Media Require New Rules
The digital communications technologies
combine wireless and wireline systems seamlessly. They merge voice,
data, and images. They are flexible and decentralized; networked
and global; open and interactive. They place choices and control
in the hands of users. They eliminate distinctions between what
is kept in the home and what is stored with third parties. Their
economics are characterized by competition and innovation. The
explosion in the amount of information transmitted and stored
electronically and the emergence of a form of online existence
for both businesses and individuals have produced a qualitative
change in the nature of communications and, accordingly, in the
amount and nature of the information that is exposed to intrusion,
interception and misuse.
New technologies enhance the ability of
law enforcement to intercept and analyze communications and track
individuals. Many of these enhancements are coming about without
government intervention, as the unintended consequences of market-driven
changes in technology. Existing law allows law enforcement to
take advantage of these developments and requires telecommunications
companies to cooperate by providing technical assistance, subject
to government reimburse-ment. As technology enhances surveillance
capabilities, the legal standards for government use of these
new technologies must adequately protect privacy.
Transactional and Signaling Data
On the Internet, which has developed in
ways unforeseen when ECPA was enacted in 1986, transactional data
has emerged as a hybrid form of data, somewhere between addressing
information and content, and is increasingly revealing of personal
patterns of association. CALEA set a higher standard for access
to transactional data regarding electronic communications; Congress
should examine how the new standard is working.
In a similar development in the area of
voice communications, advanced signaling systems have also blurred
the distinction between call-identifying information and call
content. The standards for governmental access to signaling data
(under what are known as "pen registers" and "trap
and trace devices") should be amended to require a judge
to find, based on a showing by the government, that the information
sought is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.
In light of the growing significance of
transactional and signaling data, Congress should examine more
generally the implications of government access to and analysis
of all forms of such information for subscriber profiling purposes.
One type of transactional data, namely real-time
location information generated in wireless telephone systems that
enables simultaneous tracking of cellular and other wireless phone
users, implicates such serious privacy interests that Congress
should clarify the law by requiring a warrant based on a showing
of probable cause for nonconsensual governmental access to such
information when obtained on a real-time, tracking basis.
CALEA Implementation
Law enforcement has had certain problems
preserving its communications surveillance capability in the face
of rapidly developing technology and services. In 1994, Congress
wrestled with this issue. Initially, the FBI sought what would
have amounted to de facto licensing authority over the development
and deployment of new technology. DPSWG members argued that, if
any legislation was enacted, it should be narrowly crafted to
address law enforcement's demonstrated needs while also protecting
privacy and the innovation and competitiveness that have fueled
the digital revolution. After hearings and consultations with
industry, privacy groups, and law enforcement, Congress rejected
the broad approach originally proposed by the Executive Branch.
Instead, with the unreserved support of the FBI, Congress enacted
legislation (CALEA) that established minimum functional requirements
intended to preserve but not expand law enforcement access to
communications, and deferred to industry to develop implementing
solutions.
The FBI now appears to be trying to rewrite
this legislative record, by claiming that CALEA requires surveillance
capacities that go beyond the status quo. For example, the FBI
is wrongly claiming that CALEA requires cellular and other wireless
providers to install a location tracking capability. The FBI is
also claiming that CALEA mandates interception of certain conference
calls after the target has dropped off the conversation, and delivery
of a signaling channel that includes detailed information about
the status of both the target of an investigation and persons
with whom the target communicates. Standards-setting bodies should
reject efforts to broadly interpret the CALEA standards.
To date, neither the government capacity
requirements nor the industry standards for implementing CALEA
have been finalized. In terms of capacity, the FBI's notice of
January 14, 1997 is subject to conflicting interpretations. The
FBI has only informally corrected its earlier suggestions that
the requirements projected for each county or service area must
be applied at every switching facility or by every carrier serving
the region, either of which interpretations would produce surveillance
capacity that bears no reasonable relationship to historical surveillance
needs. Delays in resolving disputes between industry and the FBI
over how broadly to interpret CALEA's capability requirements
have resulted in unforeseen delay in the issuance of industry
standards. The FBI in effect acknowledges in its March 1997 implementation
plan that, given standard industry processes for modifying equipment
and services, compliance with the CALEA deadlines is not "reasonably
achievable."
Wireless Communications
Statutory protections for wireless communications,
and prohibitions against wireless scanning, should be strengthened.
The protections of ECPA should be extended unambiguously to wireless
data communications. As noted above, Congress should clarify the
law by requiring a warrant based on a showing of probable cause
for nonconsensual real-time governmental access to wireless telephone
tracking information.
Encryption Policy
Strong encryption, widely available and
regularly used, will enhance computer and communications security
and prevent crime. On balance, the crime prevention benefits of
strong encryption outweigh the impediments it poses to law enforcement
practices. Full realization of the Internet's economic, personal,
and democratizing potential is being delayed, and the competitiveness
of American computer hardware and software companies is being
hurt, by policies of the U.S. government that prohibit the export
abroad -- and thereby inhibit the widespread use in the U.S. --
of strong encryption that is already available overseas. The Clinton
Administration's various proposals for government-regulated key
escrow, key recovery, or "key management" systems have
all been unworkable. The latest proposal, while described as voluntary,
is coercive. It seeks to promote a form of key recovery that is
too complex, too cumbersome, too costly and too vulnerable to
obtain widespread acceptance. In contrast, user-driven developments
are leading, without governmental intervention, to the emergence
of key escrow, key recovery and other trusted third party decryption
arrangements that will accommodate law enforcement's basic needs
with respect to stored data in certain cases. As market-driven
key escrow or data recovery systems develop, law enforcement agencies
will be seeking access to such voluntarily escrowed encryption
keys or decryption assistance. Accordingly, statutory protections
should be established, requiring a court order based on a showing
of specific need as the minimum for government access.
Amendments to the Wiretap Laws
Proposals to amend the wiretap laws must
be carefully scrutinized, and any amendments adopted must be narrowly
crafted to ensure that they do not erode privacy protections.
The Administration proposal to weaken the statutory suppression
rule for communications seized in violation of the wiretap law's
protections would seriously erode existing protections against
abuse of the right to be protected from unreasonable searches
and seizures. The law enforcement interests asserted as justification
for the Administration's proposals on roving taps and emergency
wiretap authority can be satisfied with changes significantly
more modest than those proposed by the Administration. Other,
privacy-enhancing amendments to the wiretap laws would protect
against abuse but would not curtail legitimate law enforcement
access.
International Issues
The U.S. government has been actively encouraging
international bodies to adopt surveillance standards for telecommunications
equipment and services. Congress should develop rules addressing
the implications for communications privacy of increasing international
law enforcement cooperation. In particular, to regulate any assistance
provided to foreign governments seeking access to escrowed keys
or decryption assistance in the United States, and to prevent
the disclosure of decryption keys or decryption assistance to
foreign governments that do not respect privacy and other human
rights or provide due process, Congress should adopt statutory
rules that include strict court order standards. Congress should
also consider the extension of statutory court order requirements
to the interception overseas by the U.S. government of electronic
communications for use in U.S. criminal investigations.
In very important ways, electronic surveillance
has always posed greater threats to privacy than the physical
searches and seizures that the Fourth Amendment was originally
intended to cover. Accordingly, special attention must be paid
to the maintenance of strong privacy protections in the electronic
field. For one thing, electronic surveillance is almost inherently
indiscriminate, raising concerns about compliance with the requirement
of particularity in the Fourth Amendment and posing the risk of
general searches. For another, the usefulness of electronic surveillance
depends on lack of notice to the suspect. In the execution of
the traditional search warrant, an announcement of authority and
purpose ("knock and notice") is required so that the
person whose privacy is being invaded can observe any violation
in the scope or conduct of the search and immediately seek a judicial
order to halt or remedy any violations. In addition, electronic
surveillance involves an on-going intrusion in a protected sphere,
unlike the traditional search warrant, which authorizes only one
intrusion, not a series or a continuous surveillance. Officers
must execute a traditional search warrant with dispatch, not over
a prolonged period of time; if they do not find what they were
looking for in a home or office, they must leave promptly and
must obtain a separate order if they wish to return to search
again. Electronic surveillance, in contrast, may go on around-the-clock
for days or months.
In 1967, in the Berger and Katz
cases, the Supreme Court ruled that electronic surveillance was
a search and seizure covered by the privacy protections of the
Fourth Amendment. 1
In Berger, the Court condemned
lengthy, continuous or indiscriminate electronic surveillances,
but in Katz, it indicated that a short surveillance, narrowly-focused
on interception of a few conversations, was constitutionally acceptable
if approved by a judge in advance. Responding to the Supreme Court's
opinions and the arguments of law enforcement that wiretapping
was a vital weapon in the efforts against organized crime, Congress
in 1968 authorized law enforcement wiretapping under a system
of protections that were intended to compensate for the uniquely
intrusive aspects of electronic surveillance.2
The wiretap provisions were Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, so the wiretap law is still referred
to sometimes as "Title III."
The legislation Congress enacted had the
following components: the content of wire communications could
be seized by the government in criminal cases pursuant to a court
order issued upon a finding of probable cause; wiretapping was
otherwise outlawed; wiretapping would be permitted only for specified
crimes; it would be authorized only as a last resort, when other
investigative techniques would not work; surveillance would be
carried out in such a way as to minimize the interception of innocent
conversations; notice would be provided after the investigation
had been concluded; and there would be an opportunity prior to
introduction of the evidence at any trial for an adversarial challenge
to both the adequacy of the probable cause and the conduct of
the wiretap. (In 1978, Congress authorized wiretapping in national
security cases through another statute, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, which was intended to be used only in foreign
intelligence and counter-intelligence cases and therefore did
not offer some of the protections required under Title III. 50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) States may authorize wiretapping under restrictions
at least as strict as the federal law.3
Whenever they discuss wiretapping, law enforcement
officials stress that electronic surveillance is rightly subject
to stringent privacy protections: that wiretaps are available
only for the most serious cases; that authorization to conduct
a tap is sought only when all other investigative techniques have
failed; that applications are subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny;
that wiretaps are conducted in such a manner as to minimize the
interception of innocent conversations; and that parties whose
conversations are intercepted are entitled to obtain after-the-fact
judicial review of the authorization and conduct of wiretaps.
There has long been criticism, however,
that the protections of Title III are not working as intended
and that components of the privacy scheme have been watered down.
Those who are concerned with the adequacy of current protections
point to the following:
(1) Wiretapping is no longer confined to
violent and major crimes. The list of crimes for which wiretapping
is permitted has expanded steadily -- from the original 26 in
1968 to 95 in 1996. The original list was largely limited to espionage
and treason, violent crimes, and offenses typically associated
with organized crime. The list has been so expanded that wiretapping
is now authorized for cases involving false statements on passport
applications and loan applications or involving "any depredation"
against any property of the United States. Further expansions
are promoted in response to each new law enforcement concern that
receives legislative attention. Wiretapping is used only rarely
in cases involving homicide, kidnapping, or terrorism. In 1994,
76% of wiretaps nationwide were in drug cases.
(2) Judicial authorization has not served
as an effective regulator on the use of electronic surveillance.
For seven years in row, 1989 through 1995, no judge, state or
federal, denied a single government request for wiretapping. (In
that period, judges approved 6,598 wiretap orders in criminal
cases.) Judges have no discretion to deny applications for pen
registers and trap and trace devices; the law states that a judge
must approve any application signed by an Assistant United
States Attorney.
(3) The courts authorize electronic surveillance
even when law enforcement agencies have not exhausted all other
reasonably available techniques.
(4) The minimization requirement has not
been strictly enforced. The courts have excused the monitoring
of innocent conversations, especially in drug cases.
(5) Defendants' after-the-fact challenges
to the authorization or conduct of surveillance are rarely sustained.
(6) The average length of intercepts and
the average number of calls intercepted per wiretap has increased
steadily, raising again the specter of general searches.
(7) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA) court in its entire 17-year history has never turned
down a government electronic surveillance request. In 1996, the
court issued a record 839 orders, up 20% from the prior year.
Meanwhile, FISA has been used increasingly in criminal cases and
was recently amended for use in secret deportation proceedings.
These are important issues that deserve
to be examined by Congress. They must be taken into account in
the consideration of any proposals by the Administration or individual
Members to further expand the scope of, or weaken the privacy
protection standards in, the wiretap laws.
That the individual shall have full protection
in person and in property is a principle as old as the common
law; but it has been found necessary from time to time to define
anew the exact nature and extent of such protection.
Brandeis & Warren, "The Right to Privacy," 4 Harvard
L. Rev. 193 (1890).
The tremendous scientific and technological
developments that have taken place in the last century have made
possible today the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance
techniques. . . . Both proponents and opponents of wiretapping
and electronic surveillance agree that the present state of the
law in this area is extremely unsatisfactory and that the Congress
should act to clarify the resulting confusion.
"Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act," Report
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Rpt.
1097 (1968) at 67.
[L]egal protection against the unreasonable
use of newer surveillance techniques has not kept pace with technology.
"Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986," Report
of the House Judiciary Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., H. Rpt.
99-647 (1986) at 18.
Telecommunications, of course, did not
stand still after 1986. Indeed, the pace of change in technology
and in the structure of the telecommunications industry accelerated
and continues to accelerate.
"Telecommunications Carrier Assistance to the Government,"
Report of the House Judiciary Committee, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess.,
H. Rpt. 103-827, Part 1 (1994) at 12.
The uses of new technologies are always
outpacing the law, often in ways that threaten privacy, but also
in ways that enhance privacy.
4
Consequently, Congress has been required periodically to examine the legal framework for protecting privacy and security while ensuring that law enforcement has the necessary and appropriate capabilities. It did so in 1986 with the adoption of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. It did so again in 1994 when it responded to law enforcement concerns about the impact of new technologies by enacting CALEA (discussed below in section IV).
A. Five Key Developments
Five broad technological developments have
profoundly challenged the assumptions made by Congress in 1968
when it first established the rules for electronic surveillance,
and in 1986 when it reaffirmed those assumptions:
(1) The rapid expansion of wireless services
-- which are increasingly used not just by the wealthy and
in business applications, but by ordinary citizens and for personal
conversations -- has made electronic communication almost totally
flexible and constantly available. The number of wireless customers
has gone from 92,000 in 1984 to 46 million today. Moreover, wireless
transmission is no longer important only for voice communication,
but is becoming increasingly important for data transfer. Wireless
modems, wireless faxes, wireless PBXs (private branch exchanges,
or switchboards), and wireless local area networks are linking
computers and transferring data that could include proprietary
information, medical records, and financial data. Wireless links
are increasingly serving as gateways to the global information
infrastructure.
Policy Implications: Theincreasing use of wireless communications services, the seamless
integration of wireless and wireline networks, and the importance
of wireless data links heighten the urgency of ensuring the privacy
and security of wireless communications, in terms of both strong
legal prohibitions against unauthorized interception and strict
legal standards for governmental access to wireless communications
and associated transactional data.
(2) The dramatic development of the Internet
has transformed all over again methods of gathering, processing
and sharing of information, which had already been transformed
by the computer itself. In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were
linked to the Internet. In 1986, when ECPA was enacted, there
were probably 50,000. By June 1996, there were over 9.4 million
host computers worldwide linked to the Internet; including users
who connect to the Internet via modem, some 40 million people
worldwide can and do access the enormously flexible Internet communications
medium. In commercial terms, networking has had enormous implications.
The average number of electronic point-of-sale transactions in
the United States went from 38 per day in 1985 to 1.2 million
per day in 1993.
The Internet is not like the telephone system,
or the mail, or mass media. The Internet combines a much broader
range of functions, serving not only the one-on-one functions
of the telephone and the mail but also the information functions
of TV, newspapers and the library; the artistic functions of a
movie theater and a museum; the political functions of a town
meeting hall; the marketing and shopping functions of a mall;
and the social, even romantic functions of a nightclub or coffee
house. US Senate hearings have been broadcast live over the Internet.
People begin romantic relationships through the Internet. Grassroots
groups across the political spectrum use the Internet to inform,
organize and galvanize. Barriers to participation are low: anyone
with a computer and a modem can be a publisher. Of course, like
any communications medium, the Internet is also used in connection
with a range of criminal conduct, and the networked nature of
the system makes computers connected to it inherently vulnerable
to criminal and other attacks.
Policy Implications: The
dramatic development of the Internet as a networked global communications
medium and the expansion in the range of transactions that occur
on-line have produced a qualitative change in the nature of communications
and, accordingly, in the nature and amount of the information
that is exposed to intrusion, interception and misuse. The Internet
is an intentionally open system of linked computers, and therefore
is inherently insecure. Strong encryption, widely available and
unencumbered by complex and expensive government dictates, is
necessary if the commercial, personal and democratizing potential
of the Internet is to be realized.
(3) Signaling information has
become an increasingly rich source of information about habits
of association and commerce. While Congress in 1968 and again
in 1986 assumed that there were two categories of data -- content
(which would receive the highest protection) and a category of
minimally revealing dialing or routing information -- transactional
data has evolved into a third, hybrid type providing detailed
information about a person's habits of association and commerce.
Yet this "profiling" data was totally unprotected until
1986 and has since been subject only to the most minimal protection.
On the Internet, this data gives a rich picture of a person's
life. In a similar development in the area of voice communications,
advanced signaling systems have also blurred the distinction between
call-identifying information and call content, requiring high
standards for governmental access. In some cellular and other
wireless telephone systems, this signaling data includes location
information, which if accessed by law enforcement without strict
controls, would turn wireless phones into tracking devices.
Policy Implications: Law enforcement is increasingly turning to transactional or signaling
data as a source of investigative importance. Some of this data,
such as location data collected on a real-time basis, is so personally
revealing that it should be protected by the probable cause warrant
standard.
(4) Control over technology has shifted
away from the hands of government and a few monopolies. Telephony
itself, as a result of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and
other factors, is now characterized by competition and rapid innovation,
producing an environment with many new products, services and
features, and many new service providers. State-of-the-art encryption
technology is no longer subject to government monopoly. The Internet
was designed from the outset as a decentralized, redundant, self-maintaining
medium for rapid transmission of information without direct human
involvement, and has evolved to a state of unprecedented openness.
Yet the Executive Branch is trying, in its encryption policy and
under CALEA, to control communications technology and shape its
growth in ways that increase the government's surveillance powers.
Policy Implications: Users
can now affirmatively choose encryption technology that will enhance
their privacy and protect the security of their data against criminals.
Government efforts to control the development of technology
become harder to sustain in light of the technology's dispersion.
While such efforts are unlikely to succeed in controlling the
technology in the ways that the government intends, they do pose
the threat of extending the power of government beyond traditional
capabilities and can easily impede the innovativeness and injure
the competitiveness of businesses.
(5) The globalization of communications
technology is breaking down national borders. One of the great
strengths of the Internet is that it can be as easy to send an
e-mail message to New York as to Nairobi. The information infrastructure
is now global, as are the markets for telecommunications products
and services.
Policy Implications: On
the one hand, the irrelevance of borders means that government
controls over information and technology become harder to maintain.
On the other hand, enforceable privacy protections have not yet
emerged for the global information infrastructure. It has been
said that, on the Internet, the Bill of Rights is a local ordinance.
This means that the US Constitution offers little privacy protection
against foreign government surveillance of US citizens whose Internet
communications regularly cross international borders. For both
the Internet and traditional telephony, new rules need to be developed
to govern US surveillance abroad and the increasing extent of
joint international operations, which currently take place in
a legal no-man's-land.
B. Developments since 1986 require a strengthening of ECPA.
Congress attempted to respond to the emergence
of wireless services and the digital era with the adoption of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA").
Title III had been limited to voice communications, whether face-to-face
or over a wire. ECPA extended Title III to wireless voice communications
and to electronic communications of a non-voice nature, such as
e-mail or other computer-to-computer transmissions. Thereby, ECPA
made it a crime to knowingly intercept wireless communications
and e-mail, but authorized law enforcement to do so with a warrant
issued on probable cause. 18 U.S.C. 2701-2703. ECPA also set up
rules for the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices,
18 U.S.C. 3121-3127, and set rules for law enforcement access
to information identifying a subscriber to an electronic communications
service, 18 U.S.C. 2703(c). ECPA also eased certain procedural
requirements for interception of wire communications by federal
law enforcement officers.
In drafting ECPA, however, Congress did
not reexamine the most basic assumption that underpinned Title
III in 1968: that capture of electronic communications was not
an unreasonable intrusion if there was stringent ex parte judicial
review before the fact, minimization during a search, and equally
stringent adversarial review after the investigation had been
completed. These rules were developed in a monopolistic, wire-based,
voice-centered, one-on-one environment. Some of them, such as
the minimization rule, are not readily applicable to non-voice
communications.5 Moreover, much has changed
in the use of communications technology since the basic scheme
of the wiretap laws was laid down in 1968 and even since it was
reaffirmed in 1986. In fundamental ways, the Internet is not like
the telephone system or the mail system. The development of a
form of on-line existence in "cyberspace" was only barely
anticipated in 1986. As a result of the digital revolution and
attendant changes in the use of technology, to intercept all a
person's electronic communications means a lot more today than
it did in 1968 or 1986. New rules may be needed.
In many ways, ECPA has proven to be a durable
statute, but technology has evolved in ways not even contemplated
when ECPA was enacted. These developments call for an examination
of the effectiveness and coverage of ECPA. As one step in this
direction, CALEA set a higher standard for access to transactional
data regarding electronic communications; Congress should examine
how the new standard is working. 18 U.S.C. 2703(c). A similar
development has occurred in the area of voice communications,
as advanced signaling systems have blurred the distinction between
call identifying information and call content. Currently, the
standards for governmental access to signaling data under what
are known as "pen registers" and "trap and trace
devices" require a court order, but the statute puts the
judge in a purely ministerial role: the sole function of the judge
is to determine whether the signature of an Assistant United States
Attorney is on the application. 18 U.S.C. 3123(a). Instead, the
standard should require the judge to find, based on a showing
by the government, that the information sought is relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation, giving some meaning
to judicial oversight.
C. Changes in Technology Exacerbate the Constitutional Vulnerability of Records
Held by Third Parties, Requiring a New Look at the Fourth Amendment-Based
Rules On Government Access.
The profound changes that are occurring
in communications and computer technology challenge a set of assumptions
about the degree of protection from governmental access one is
justified to expect with respect to records held by third parties.
Our focus here is on the rules for government access to communications
and transactional information, rules that have their source in
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. Other issues related
to how information is collected, retained, used, and exchanged
in the employment and business contexts must be addressed under
the concept of fair information practices; such questions are
not addressed in this interim report.
In 1976, in US v. Miller, 428 U.S.
435, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals had no constitutionally
protected privacy interest in business records that were held
by a third party. Miller involved checks held by a bank,
and the rationale of the case assumed a world of paper records,
yet the holding in its broadest implications has been applied
unquestioningly to the electronic world. There have been efforts
of varying success at the federal and state level to develop statutory
rules for governmental access to special categories of personal
records held by third parties, such as bank records, video rental
records, library records, or medical records. These efforts have
been limited in scope, each category of records being treated
separately.
Moreover, records privacy issues have been
approached without adequate attention to the developments in communications
technology that we discuss here. It is widely recognized that
there has been an exponential growth in the volume and variety
of information that is now stored in networked systems. However,
there has been little focus on the communicative, associational
nature of records created in an online environment. In an era
when people work for "virtual companies" and conduct
personal, political and business lives in "cyberspace,"
the distinction between the communication of information and the
storage of information is increasingly blurred. Furthermore, public
key encryption may radically change the legal notion of what is
a reasonable expectation of privacy. The growth of online commerce,
politics and relationships; the shift to distributed, networked
computing; the growth of the World Wide Web as an information
source; and the ready ability to encrypt records stored with third
parties call into question the application to the Internet of
concepts developed for governmental access to business records
in a relatively static, paper-based environment.
In this report, we make no specific recommendations
for changes in the rules on governmental access to records held
by third parties. ECPA itself addressed the question of governmental
access to e-mail and to associated transactional records, and
CALEA sought to increase the standard for governmental access
to transactional records. Congress should examine how well the
ECPA/CALEA standard is working.
Congress should also consider how the lines
have been drawn between records entitled to full Fourth Amendment
protection and records that fall outside the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. There are now essentially three legal regimes
for access to electronic data: (i) the traditional Fourth Amendment
standard, for records stored on an individual's hard drive or
floppy disks; (ii) the Title III-ECPA standard, for records in
transmission; and (iii) a third, the scope of which is probably
unclear, for records stored on a remote server, such as the research
paper (or the diary) of a student stored on a university server
or the records (including the personal correspondence) of an employee
stored on the server of the employer. As the third category of
records expands because people find it more convenient to store
records remotely, the legal ambiguity grows more significant.
Are the records stored on such a server accessible by mere subpoena?
Are they covered by the "remote computing" provisions
of ECPA, 18 U.S.C. 2703? If the records were seized from the individual's
hard drive or floppies using a warrant or subpoena, contemporaneous
notice would be required. If the records were seized in transmission,
a court order would be required, but the interception could proceed
secretly. If the records were seized from a third party, notice
might be delayed.
Do these distinctions make sense any more?
Conceptions of the Fourth Amendment developed in a 20th century
world of paper records may not be applicable to 21st century technologies
where many of our most important records are not "papers"
in our "houses," but are "bytes" stored electronically
and accessed remotely at "virtual" locations.
"In the long term, digital telephone
technology will enhance the FBI's ability to collect, share and
analyze information. Many of these enhancements will come without
any FBI development effort, driven by consumer demand." 6
It is clear that the FBI's prediction, made
in 1991, is coming true. While Section IV examines Congress' response
to FBI concerns that new technology is making electronic surveillance
harder, in this section of the report, we examine some of the
ways in which new communications and computer technologies provide
substantial advantages to law enforcement.
1. Wireless Services.
In a host of circumstances where in the past persons
would have used pay phones or not made a call at all, they now
use cellular or other wireless phones, which are readily tapped
at central switches. (It is normally far easier to identify a
target's wireless service provider than it is to predict which
pay phone he or she will use.) Proportionately more wireless phones
are tapped by law enforcement than traditional wireline phones.7
Indeed, law enforcement has been so quick to utilize this capability
that in some urban areas cellular companies had been unable to
accommodate simultaneously all of the law enforcement agencies
seeking to tap cellular phones from mobile telephone switching
offices, and had to install additional capacity. (This expansion
of cellular wiretap capacity was begun before CALEA.)
2. Location information.
In the course of processing calls, many wireless
communications systems collect information about the cell site
(or the sector within a cell site) of the person making or receiving
a call. Systems may even locate a cellular phone merely while
it is turned on, even if it is not handling a call. The technology
is proceeding in the direction of providing more precise location
information, a trend that has been boosted by the rulings of the
Federal Communications Commission in the "E911" (enhanced
911) proceeding, which requires service providers to develop a
locator capability for medical emergency and rescue purposes.8
This information can be obtained by law enforcement. If it is
a record collected and stored as part of the billing process,
it can be obtained under current law by a mere subpoena. In 1994,
again before CALEA, three of the four manufacturers of cellular
switches had developed the software capability to deliver location
information to law enforcement immediately upon call completion.9
3. E-mail and other on-line communications.
E-mail is in some respects
easier to intercept than regular mail. Indeed, since e-mail messages
are often stored with a service provider for a period of time
before they are read by the intended recipient (and even sometimes
after they are read), e-mail is less transient than telephone
calls and thus more vulnerable to interception. Law enforcement
can intercept a person's other Internet activity in real time,
usually by monitoring the phone line that serves as most people's
connection to the Net. This allows law enforcement, when it chooses
to do so, to obtain an extraordinary window into a person's life.
More readily, e-mail messages can be obtained from the host computer
of the service provider; this is the method more commonly used
by law enforcement to access e-mail.
4. Remote monitoring.
Technology has freed law enforcement intercepts
of the constraints of geography. Agents monitoring wiretaps do
not have to sit hunched in vans outside the target's house. Instead,
the intercepted communications can be transported hundreds or
thousands of miles to a monitoring facility at a law enforcement
office. It is now common in investigations spanning multiple jurisdictions
to establish a single monitoring plant and transmit there in real
time all intercepted conversations to be monitored, minimized,
and recorded. (The courts have held that a single federal judge
can issue wiretap orders for telephones anywhere in the country,
so long as the personnel listening to the conversations work in
the judge's jurisdiction.10) The Drug
Enforcement Agency has taken this concept one step further. As
the Washington Post reported in November,11
the DEA forwards intercepts from many different investigations
to a central facility in Utah, where they are monitored, transcribed
and translated by military personnel.
5. Computer analysis.
As noted above, law enforcement has recognized the
informational richness of signaling and transactional information.
Computer analysis is key to law enforcement exploitation of this
data. Computers have made it possible for law enforcement agencies
to analyze far more easily vast amounts of information about personal
communications patterns. Pen registers, which recorded the numbers
dialed on a particular phone line, have been superseded by multiline
dialed number recorders and these in turn have been computerized,
allowing agencies to automatically search for revealing patterns
of calls. The DEA has developed an integrated system called TOLLS
that will electronically load telephone call data from dialed
number recorders into a mainframe system for matching and analysis.
Yet further developments may be around the corner. Voice recognition
technology, for example, would free law enforcement from the most
labor intensive aspects of monitoring conversations.
Existing rules allow law enforcement to
take full advantage of these enhancements. Since 1970, the federal
wiretap statute has required telephone companies, services providers
and all others to provide all technical assistance to law enforcement
agencies seeking to carry out authorized interceptions. 18 U.S.C.
2815(4).
While developments in technology mean that
electronic surveillance can collect far more personal information,
and while some developments make surveillance easier in some respects,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in recent years has been concerned
that technological developments make law enforcement interception
more difficult in other respects. These difficulties are often
encompassed by the term "digital telephony," although
digital transmission itself is not really the problem. In hearings
in 1994, the FBI cited a variety of concerns, some of which existed
in analog systems: problems intercepting calls rerouted through
call forwarding, or the inability to identify the destination
of a call when a customer used a speed dialing feature. The FBI
anticipated increasing trouble in covertly isolating the communication
stream associated with a particular target as multiplexed transmission
technologies and fiber cables replaced the paired copper wires
that traditionally had been associated uniquely with each customer.
Congress responded to these technological
developments by enacting the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-414 ("CALEA," sometimes
referred to as the "digital telephony" legislation).
CALEA required telephone companies to ensure that new technologies
(and some old technologies) did not impede law enforcement interception
of communications. The legislation was intended to preserve the
status quo in terms of government surveillance, without expanding
government capabilities. Congress stressed that the requirements
of CALEA should be narrowly interpreted.
However, law enforcement has attempted to
broadly interpret the require-ments of CALEA to mandate a nationwide
capability in excess of traditional interception practices. The
most notable and most troubling aspect of this is the FBI effort
to use CALEA, in contravention of explicit assurances during the
drafting process, to require cellular phone companies and other
wireless service providers to have a location tracking capability
built into their systems for law enforcement purposes. The FBI
is also claiming, for example, that CALEA mandates interception
of certain conference calls after the targeted facility has been
dropped from the conversation, thus continuing the surveillance
against parties and facilities for which no judicial approval
was granted. In terms of signaling information, the FBI has argued
that CALEA requires the configuration and delivery of a signaling
channel that includes detailed message notifications about the
targeted facility whether or not there is a call in progress and
about facilities not identified in the surveillance order. Furthermore,
published reports quote FBI officials as stating that they will
soon seek additional authority over the design of telecommunications
systems.12
A. CALEA Was Premised on the Effective Enforcement of Strict Privacy Protections
CALEA was based on the dual premise that
the laws authorizing electronic surveillance have strict legal
requirements to protect privacy and that those standards are strictly
enforced by the courts. In the absence of such strict legal requirements
-- if they are weakened legislatively or if they are not enforced
by the courts -- then the premise of CALEA falters and the legislation
becomes far more threatening, requiring as it did the ubiquitous
adoption of features in the nation's telephone systems to ensure
ready government access.
Already the Justice Department has successfully
won Congressional repeal of one of the privacy enhancements adopted
in CALEA with the intent of balancing privacy concerns with law
enforcement needs (the provision extending ECPA to wireless data
transfers). In addition, in the anti-terrorism law, Congress created
exemptions from the carefully crafted privacy protection standards
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Further, the Justice
Department continues to pursue other amendments that would loosen
the privacy standards of the wiretap laws by weakening the sanctions
against illegal wiretapping and making it easier to obtain roving
tap and warrantless tap authority.
Some clarifications in the wiretap laws
may be warranted. But it would undermine one of the foundations
of CALEA if those changes weakened the existing privacy protections,
or if those protections are not working as intended to limit investigative
agency discretion. Unless Title III and FISA constitute meaningful
privacy legislation, in light of judicial interpretation and continuing
technological developments, the foundation of CALEA will be eroded.
B. Development of the CALEA Legislation
In the Bush Administration, the Justice
Department brought to Congress legislation that would have created
de facto licensing authority over the development and deployment
of new communications technology. DPSWG members worked to ensure
that any legislation would be narrowly crafted to address identified
problems while also providing for public accountability and protecting
privacy and the innovation and competitiveness that have fueled
the digital revolution. After hearings and consultations with
industry, privacy groups, and law enforcement, Congress rejected
the broad approach originally proposed by the FBI. Instead, with
the strong support of the FBI, Congress enacted a CALEA that established
minimum functional requirements intended to preserve but not expand
law enforcement access to communications, and deferred to industry
to develop solutions.
CALEA was intended to preserve the status
quo in terms of law enforcement surveillance. CALEA requires telephone
companies to design (and in some cases retrofit) their networks
to ensure that law enforcement agencies can carry out electronic
surveillance on advanced digital equipment and services. It imposes
on "telecommunications carriers" four requirements,
pertaining to (1) the interception of call content; (2) the interception
of call-identifying information; (3) the delivery to law enforcement
of intercepted call content and call-identifying information;
and (4) the security of intercept operations and the privacy and
security of communications not authorized to be intercepted. Manufacturers
are required to make available, "on a reasonably timely basis
and at a reasonable charge," such features or modifications
as are necessary to permit carriers to comply with CALEA capability
and capacity requirements.
Congress intended that, in the first instance,
common carriers and equipment manufacturers, not government agencies,
would develop publicly the details for implementation of these
assistance requirements. Congress expected that this approach
would temper law enforcement demands with considerations of cost,
competitiveness, innovation, security and privacy. Even if industry
failed to produce a standard or if the FBI had concerns about
the standard, the legislation gave to the Federal Communications
Commission, not the FBI, the authority to develop an appropriate
standard.
Now, the FBI appears to be trying to rewrite
the legislative record, by claiming that CALEA requires surveillance
capabilities and capacities that go beyond the status quo. Instead
of proceeding promptly to implement a narrow set of requirements
-- requirements that would preserve the status quo and be largely
achievable within currently deployed systems -- the FBI is claiming
that CALEA mandates as a baseline the installation of many advanced
capabilities that go far beyond traditional wiretap capabilities.
C. Law Enforcement Is Able to Take Advantage of All Advances in Technology
In considering the FBI's claims for enhanced
capabilities, it is important to recognize the difference between
what CALEA mandated as a minimum national standard for law enforcement
access versus the expansions in surveillance capability that were
coming about as a result of market-driven technological developments.
Before CALEA, some changes in telecommunications technology were
making law enforcement surveillance harder, while other changes
were making surveillance easier or more productive. CALEA was
intended to "preserve the status quo" by ensuring that
technological developments did not erode law enforcement access
to call content and identifying information. Congress did not
intend to impede the development of technology that makes surveillance
easier or more fruitful, nor did it intend to deny law enforcement
the authority to take advantage of those developments (such as
the availability of location information in cellular systems).13
Congress left intact the existing
authority under 18 U.S.C. 2518(4), which authorizes law enforcement
to take advantage of all technological developments enhancing
surveillance capability and requires companies to make available
whatever capability they have and to provide special assistance
on a case-by-case basis, with compensation. But Congress most
assuredly did not mandate the nationwide ubiquitous installation
of such enhanced capabilities. Instead, Congress mandated the
nationwide availability only of certain minimum features, based
upon its understanding of past practices as described in the CALEA
hearings and based upon the FBI's description in the CALEA hearings
of what its needs were.
D. CALEA Implementation Issues
In broad respects, CALEA is working as Congress
intended: The FBI published in the Federal Register a capacity
notice that was widely criticized and withdrawn. The FBI has now
published a second capacity notice with much more data, 62 Fed.
Reg. 1902 (Jan. 14, 1997), but that second notice also raises
serious questions, which the Bureau must address in finalizing
the capacity requirements. Meanwhile, in terms of capability,
industry bodies have drafted "safe harbor" technical
standards, to provide the detail necessary to translate CALEA's
broad functional requirements into network and equipment specifications.
In this standards process, the FBI had extensive input, articulating
law enforcement's desires and pushing hard for an expansive reading
of the requirements. The industry standards associations, while
striving to understand and accommodate law enforcement's interests,
adhered to Congress' intent that the CALEA requirements be narrowly
interpreted.
We are concerned, however, that the FBI
is continuing to press for surveillance features that would expand
the government's electronic surveillance capability beyond its
current reach, in contravention of the clear intent of CALEA,
with implications for privacy and at potentially great cost to
industry and/or taxpayers. These expansive demands by the FBI
have introduced delay and uncertainty into the CALEA implementation
process.
In March 1997, the FBI submitted to Congress
an "implementation plan" which glosses over these problems
and creates the misleading impression that the CALEA implementation
process is running smoothly.14 A response by industry and privacy
advocates to the plan is attached to this report as Appendix B.
[Part I] [Part II]
If there has been one overall flaw in the
process so far, it has been the failure to set priorities. Perhaps
due to an understandable concern on the part of law enforcement
that it has only one chance now to build surveillance features
into the design process, the FBI has adopted the posture that
it has to have everything immediately. The objective of preserving
law enforcement's surveillance access would be better served by
a public process of setting priorities that will give adequate
attention to the protection of privacy interests.
In particular, we have identified the following concerns:
1. Expansion of Surveillance Capabilities
The FBI is arguing that CALEA mandates surveillance
features that would expand the government's electronic surveillance
capability beyond current capabilities, contrary to the intent
of CALEA, at great cost to telecommunications companies and/or
taxpayers and in some cases with adverse impact on privacy. Perhaps
the most troubling of these is the FBI's claim that CALEA mandates
cellular and other wireless telephone companies to provide location
information on wireless telephone users.
Another capability sought by the FBI is
the ability to monitor all conversations during a conference call
initiated by a targeted facility, even if the targeted facility
is on hold or has hung up from the call.15
Not only is it unclear that such a capability is mandated by CALEA,
but it is questionable whether law enforcement has authority under
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Title
III to intercept communications involving only non-targeted facilities
just because a targeted facility initiated a conference call.
Much of the controversy hinges on the definition
of the CALEA term "call-identifying information." The
plain language of CALEA and the legislative history indicate that
"call-identifying information" means the numbers dialed
by a subscriber to direct a communication, or other signaling
information that serves the same call routing purpose as the dialed
digits. This includes the switch-based information equivalent
to a seven or ten digit phone number that directs a call when
a voice dialing or speed dialing feature is used. The term probably
also includes information indicating that the party under surveillance
has terminated a call by hanging up.
However, the FBI has argued that this term
includes location-related information (cell site/sector), including
"location-related updates during calls," as well as
detailed "call progress" tones relating to both the
target of the investigation and persons with whom the target communicates,
including: party join/hold messages during three-way calls that
indicate when a party who is not the target of the surveillance
drops off a three-way call; voice message waiting tones to notify
the government when a surveillance target has a voice mail waiting;
and feature status messages that notify the government in real
time when a surveillance target changes his or her mix of service
features.
The FBI's view of CALEA is embodied in a
document known as the Electronic Surveillance Interface (ESI).
It includes numerous features that go beyond the status quo, and
that have no support in CALEA or the legislative history. This
effort by the FBI to broadly interpret CALEA to expand law enforcement's
capabilities contravenes the clear intent of Congress, as expressed
by both House and Senate Judiciary Committees: "The Committee
expects industry, law enforcement and the FCC to narrowly interpret
the requirements."16 There is a concern
that the FBI will seek to dominate the industry balloting process
to argue that any standard short of the ESI is deficient.17
2. Location Information
The FBI has been trying to use CALEA to
expand its surveillance powers by requiring cellular and other
wireless systems to provide location and location update information.
Industry is prepared to provide location information whenever
it is reasonably available. The dispute has concerned whether
location tracking capabilities must be built into wireless systems
as a CALEA mandate.
It is clear that Congress did not intend
to impose geographic location information as a CALEA requirement
with respect to cellular or other wireless systems. Early in 1994,
the FBI expressly assured the Congress that CALEA did not mandate
provision of location information, and as the negotiations over
legislative language progressed no one ever said that any of the
changes made were intended to bring location information within
the scope of CALEA requirements. (If the FBI or the sponsors ever
were to have said that, the negotiations would have ended, as
concerns with "location tracking" were a major impediment
to enactment of the legislation.) The FBI put location information
off the table at an early stage and it stayed off. Specifically,
no one indicated that a change in terminology from "call
setup information" in an earlier draft to "call-identifying
information" in the enacted law was intended to make location
information a legislative mandate.
The FBI attempts to expand the definition
of call-identifying information by reference to a proviso in the
call-identifying requirement, which is the only mention of location
information in CALEA itself. Under that provision, carriers are
prohibited from giving location information to law enforcement
under a pen register or trap and trace authorization. This restriction
emerged because, as Congress was advised during the CALEA hearings,
location information was already available in some cellular systems
and would continue to be available even without a statutory mandate.
In response to privacy concerns, Congress included in CALEA the
provision that requires carriers to ensure that location information
is not provided to law enforcement under the minimal standard
for a pen register or trap and trace device. This express prohibition
against providing location information in some cases cannot be
turned into an implied requirement to provide it in other, unspecified
cases, especially given the FBI's express and never retracted
assurances on the record that location information was not mandated
by CALEA and Congress' injunction that the CALEA requirements
must be narrowly interpreted
3. Capacity Requirements
In October 1995, the FBI issued a notice
of capacity requirements that failed to include information expressly
required under CALEA, namely the projected number of intercepts
that law enforcement expected to perform in the future and the
geographic areas where those intercepts were expected to occur.
The notice was roundly criticized by industry and civil liberties
advocates and was withdrawn by the FBI.
On January 14, 1997, the FBI issued a new
capacity notice, with the actual number of projected intercepts
for each county or service area in the country, and released its
baseline data.
For many areas of the country, the FBI methodology
in the second notice overstates the historical baseline activity
in the following way: The Bureau compiled data, consisting of
combined federal, state and local law enforcement surveillance
activity for each county or service area nationwide, between 1993
and 1995. From this data, the FBI determined the 24-hour peak
of surveillance activity for each switch, over the course of the
26 month survey period. From switch to switch, these peaks did
not occur on the same day, let alone "simultaneously,"
but the FBI added them together to obtain a county-wide or service
area-wide "peak" which the notice requires companies
to meet as if the surveillances occurred all on the same day.
Moreover, the notice and some of the FBI's
informal comments about it have seemed to imply that each carrier
operating in a county or service area would have to meet the full
county-wide requirement, even if the carrier only served a portion
of the customers in the area. Even broader interpretations of
the notice, which the FBI has informally disavowed,18
would require carriers to install in each switch a capacity sufficient
to meet the requirements projected for an entire county or multi-county
service area. Under either of these interpretations, the requirements
of the second notice would require industry to install capacity
unrelated to historical surveillance activity, costing taxpayers
many millions of dollars in unnecessary reimbursement.
The FBI should confirm the narrow reading
of the notice on the record and should provide carriers and the
public clear criteria for translating the numbers of intercepts
into carrier-by-carrier, switch-by-switch obligations. The FBI
should reaffirm that it intends to reimburse carriers for all
capacity upgrades.
4. Funding
Funds for reimbursing carriers for modifications
to existing facilities were not appropriated until the fiscal
year that began on October 1, 1996, and none of the funds can
be released until the FBI meets certain reporting requirements
established by Congress. In an effort to satisfy these requirements,
the FBI has transmitted to the Congress an "implementation
plan." As explained in Appendix B, the FBI plan is seriously
misleading and demonstrates the need for close Congressional oversight
of the expenditure of CALEA implementation funds.
5. Public Accountability
While the FBI has now gone a long way towards
disclosing information relating to implementation of CALEA's capacity
requirements, we are concerned about the lack of a formal means
for disclosing publicly information on the government's interpretation
of the capability requirements. Last year, the FBI issued a document,
known as the Electronic Surveillance Interface (ESI), that detailed
how the FBI interpreted one of CALEA's four requirements: the
delivery of intercepted call content and identifying information
to law enforcement. The document was originally circulated only
to telephone companies and manufacturers, under a non-disclosure
agreement, so privacy and other public interest organizations
were not authorized to receive it. (On an unauthorized basis,
the document has received wider circulation.) The FBI circulated
to select recipients a legal memorandum analyzing the call-identifying
requirement of the legislation. There has been no other documentation
defining how the FBI interprets the call content requirement of
the statute.
Meanwhile, the FBI is trying to require
carriers to enter into "cooperative agreements" with
it, asserting that only by signing a cooperative agreement can
a carrier be reimbursed. In addition to offering the FBI an avenue
to impose on carriers terms and conditions not mandated by CALEA,
the cooperative agreements would remove the CALEA implementation
process out of the public eye and into the realm of contract negotiation.
CALEA's goal of accountability is also undermined
to the extent that the costs of CALEA compliance are shifted to
the telephone companies: the less that the costs of retrofitting
equipment are subject to reimbursement, the less are they subject
to the control and public oversight of the Congressional appropriations
process.
6. Compliance Deadlines and Reimbursement
The effective date of the CALEA capability
requirements is October 25, 1998, four years after the date of
enactment. (Different rules apply to compliance with the capacity
requirements.) CALEA provides that network facilities deployed
on or before January 1, 1995 are deemed to be in compliance with
the Act until they are replaced, significantly upgraded or otherwise
undergo major modification. CALEA sec. 108(c)(3), 47 U.S.C. 1007(c)(3).
Congress assumed that, as such facilities were replaced, significantly
upgraded or underwent major modification, they could be brought
into compliance with CALEA at minimal expense. (The government
can secure immediate compliance before the equipment is replaced
or upgraded if it pays for retrofitting.)
However, Congress recognized that it might
be difficult to retrofit equipment deployed after January 1, 1995.
Therefore, it specified that equipment deployed after January
1, 1995 had to be rendered compliant at industry expense only
if compliance was "reasonably achievable." CALEA established
a proceeding at the FCC to determine whether compliance is "reasonably
achievable" with respect to any equipment, facility, or service
installed or deployed after January 1, 1995. It is not clear,
however, that an FCC proceeding is the only mechanism to make
that determination. CALEA could be read as allowing the Attorney
General, in the absence of an FCC proceeding, to determine that
compliance is not reasonably achievable. (The Attorney General
could not, however, overrule the FCC, deciding that compliance
was reasonably achievable if the FCC found it was not).
Telephone company networks have changed
far more rapidly than Congress anticipated as recently as 1994,
when CALEA was being drafted. The Telecommunications Reform Act
of 1996 accelerated the pace at which new features and new technologies,
not to mention entirely new service providers, are entering the
market. Already, companies comprising the United States Telephone
Association report that since January 1, 1995 they have replaced,
upgraded or modified software and/or hardware in over 50%, and
possibly up to 75%, of their networks.
Meanwhile, however, despite good faith efforts
by both law enforcement and industry, the adoption of industry
standards and the issuance of capacity requirements have lagged
as industry and the FBI have made efforts to resolve disputes
over whether surveillance capabilities and capacities urged by
the FBI exceed the parameters of CALEA.
Consequently, deployment of "CALEA-compliant"
technology is as impractical today as it was the day CALEA was
enacted. Given the delay in developing industry standards and
the lack of a finalized capacity notice, it has been impossible
for companies to ensure that upgrades and modifications made,
and new equipment installed, after January 1, 1995 are "CALEA-compliant"
in the view of the FBI.
Indeed, in its implementation plan submitted
to Congress in March 1997, the FBI essentially admitted that the
October 1998 deadline cannot be met with respect to equipment
installed or substantially modified after January 1, 1995. The
implementation plan notes that standard industry business practices
throughout the telecommunications industry require a 6 month systems
engineering process followed by a 12 month engineering development
process, before systems deployment can begin. As the FBI notes,
systems engineering cannot begin until requirements are determined.
The earliest that requirements will be available, in the form
of the industry standard, is the second quarter of 1997.19
Therefore, even under the FBI's view, solutions will not be available
for installation in carriers' networks until the very end of 1998,
at the earliest.
We recognize that Congress was serious about
the CALEA deadlines. On the other hand, Congress wove throughout
CALEA the concept of reasonableness. Congress intended that reimbursement
would be available for retrofitting equipment installed after
January 1, 1995 if compliance was not reasonably achievable. It
should now be clear that, so long as the FBI insists on interpreting
CALEA as imposing mandates that go beyond the status quo, compliance
is not "reasonably achievable" for facilities, features
and services deployed after January 1, 1995, until the standards
and the technology to meet them are available. The industry standard
has now been drafted and is undergoing balloting, through June
24. The test for determining when compliance is reasonable should
be based on when the concept of CALEA-compliance is settled through
the standards process, when "real" capacity numbers
are known, and when the technology is reasonably available, taking
deployment needs into account. Until then, equipment upgraded
or deployed after January 1, 1995 should be deemed in compliance
(unless the Attorney General agrees to reimburse carriers for
modifications). We note that a challenge by the FBI to the industry
standard currently in its final stages would further delay implementation.
We also note in this regard that there is
no crisis in law enforcement access to new technologies. There
is no common carrier technology or system in service that is "untappable."
Every year, despite the introduction of new digital technologies
and equipment, the number of wiretaps successfully executed goes
up. Indeed, the industry knows of not a single case in which it
was impossible to carry out a wiretap order. The type of problems
that have arisen have involved situations where law enforcement
can intercept some but not all of a target's communications.
One example is forwarded calls.20 But
this is a problem that has existed for 20 years. Problems have
been encountered in some cellular systems, but they have concerned
primarily the capacity of cellular switches to accommodate multiple
simultaneous taps; cellular switches are readily tapped and capacity
problems were being addressed even before CALEA was enacted.
7. Privacy and Security
Congressional attention needs to be given
to whether the implementation process has adequately addressed
the requirement in Section 103(a)(4) that CALEA implementation
decisions be made in a way that protects the privacy and security
of communications not authorized to be intercepted, and the requirement
in Section 105 that carriers ensure that any interception within
their switching premises be activated only in compliance with
a court order and with the affirmative intervention of an individual
officer or employee of the carrier. Attention also needs to be
given to law enforcement compliance with the new language in the
pen register and trap and trace section, 18 U.S.C. 3121(c), requiring
the use of reasonably available technology that limits pen registers
and trap and trace devices to the collection only of "dialing
and signaling information used in call processing." In its
capacity notice, the FBI did not draw a distinction between capacity
for call content interceptions and capacity for pen registers
and trap and trace devices, seemingly requiring the same type
of capacity for both, even though 90% of law enforcement intercepts
are of the later, less intrusive type.
8. CALEA Coverage
For a decade, the government has had clear
authority to intercept E-mail and other on-line services. Because
there was no problem intercepting E-mail, CALEA did not require
Internet service providers to design their systems to satisfy
law enforcement requirements. Instead, CALEA requires the providers
of telephone service to meet CALEA standards, and law enforcement
will intercept whatever traverses the telephone line, including
e-mail or other Internet services. The evidence so far is that
this approach was correct, and FBI officials have indicated to
the DPSWG electronic surveillance task force that they are satisfied
with the coverage of CALEA, focusing on the public switched network.
Generally, it appears that there are no "untappable"
communications services available or under development. However,
we continue to hear expressions of concern that the FBI wishes
to revisit the scope of CALEA coverage.
In addition, there continue to be concerns
on the part of the local exchange operators that the FBI is focusing
solely on them and is ignoring the competitive access providers
and other new entrants, even though such competitors are clearly
within the definition of "telecommunications carrier."
Illegal electronic intrusion into computer
networks is a rapidly escalating crime problem. White collar criminals,
economic espionage agents, organized crime groups, foreign intelligence
agents, and terrorist groups have been identified as "electronic
intruders" responsible for penetrations of American computer
networks. It is estimated that the Pentagon's computers are subject
to hackers' attempts 250,000 times a year. The United States Government
relies upon the National Information Infrastructure (NII) for
the efficient, uninterrupted flow of electronic information for
air traffic control, military communications, energy distribution,
public safety, and other essential government programs and services.
Intelligence and industry forecasts indicate the United States
is just beginning to realize the potentially damaging effects
and extent of the computer crime problem.
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FY
1998 Authorization and Budget Request for the Congress,"
at A-3 (1997).
[O]n balance, the advantages of more
widespread use of cryptography outweigh the disadvantages.
National Research Council, "Cryptography's Role in Securing
the Information Society," 300 (1996) ("NRC Report").
Newer communications media are inherently
insecure. Wireless telephones have great advantages in convenience
compared with wireline counterparts. Yet, since wireless phones
transmit over the airwaves, eavesdropping is easier not only for
curious neighbors but also for burglars identifying potential
targets and industrial spies stealing trade secrets. Similarly,
decentralized computer networks such as the Internet have low
barriers to entry, are much less expensive, are more robust and
can be used to accomplish a far greater variety of tasks than
the proprietary networks of the past, but, again, at the expense
of intrinsic security. The vulnerabilities of the national and
global information infrastructures have been recognized not only
by the FBI, but also by the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Information Warfare-Defense21 and by President
Clinton in creating the Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection.22
Given these inherent vulnerabilities, widespread
use of encryption to protect communications and stored data is
essential to prevent fraud and other forms of crime in the digital
age. At the same time, encryption poses challenges to law enforcement
and national security agencies, which have raised the specter
of criminal suspects' undecipherable stored information or voice
communications. We agree with the NRC that, on balance, the security-enhancing,
crime-preventing benefits of encryption outweigh the impediments
to law enforcement.
The current debate over control of encryption
technology is in some ways a conflict between two competing models
of security, (i) one in which private individuals, businesses
and governments choose from a variety of encryption options to
protect their security, and (ii) the other, in which the federal
government assumes primary responsibility for protecting personal
and business as well as governmental security through government-promoted
weaknesses in encryption technology. The centralized model of
security based on government-controlled encryption weaknesses
is incompatible with certain defining characteristics of the digital
communications revolution: decentralization, competition, globalization,
and the dynamics of decreasing cost and increasing computing power
that have put more control and more choices in the hands of end
users.
While there are law enforcement equities
on both sides of the encryption issue, the privacy and commercial
benefits of encryption are unchallenged, and ultimately dispositive.23
The Executive Branch's various efforts to impose a centralized
model of security on a decentralized medium have delayed full
realization of the Internet's economic, personal and democratizing
potential and have hurt the competitiveness of American computer
companies by prohibiting the export abroad -- and thereby inhibiting
the use in the U.S. -- of strong encryption that is already available
overseas.
We note the following:
(1) The vulnerabilities of unencrypted computer
files and electronic communications (because of the open, decentralized,
interconnected nature of the medium) are well-documented, and
are acknowledged by the government. The losses to date from inadequate
system security are enormous. In one series of transactions in
1994, an international group of criminals penetrated Citicorp's
computerized electronic transfer system and moved about $12 million
from legitimate customer accounts into their own accounts in banks
around the world. The National Research Council recently concluded:
"Of all the information vulnerabilities facing U.S. companies
internationally, electronic vulnerabilities appear to be the most
significant." NRC Report, supra, at 31.
(2) The application of encryption technology
is still evolving, rapidly. The market is still developing mechanisms
for verifying digital identities and handling keys. The fact that
the technology and its applications are still undergoing rapid
development, driven by user needs, is further evidence that government
controls should be viewed skeptically, for government controls
are most likely to have the effect of stifling the development
of viable solutions.
(3) In the four years since the Clipper
Chip was introduced, the market has rejected all government proposals
to control encryption technology. Proposals for government agencies
to serve as key escrow agents involve a level of vulnerability
that is unacceptable to business and individual users. Other approaches
that depend upon government licensing or "registration"
of escrow agents or other forms of government control of decryption
mechanisms (including proposals to require key recovery features
as a condition of receiving public key certificates) are also
not viable. The type of ubiquitous, near-instantaneous key escrow,
key recovery, or key management "infrastructure" sought
by the U.S. government is so complex, so vulnerable, so expensive
and/or so cumbersome -- so fundamentally at odds with user needs
-- that it will not by accepted by users. (If an encryption system
is expensive or cumbersome, it will not be widely used.)
(4) There is no policy option that can prevent
criminals from using strong encryption. Strong non-escrowed encryption
is and will continue to be available to the committed. There are
currently over 500 encryption products available worldwide. Even
under the current regime of tight export controls, law enforcement
has encountered strong encryption in the hands of criminals.
(5) While it is clear that most businesses
and individuals will not trust the government or government-dictated
private structures to hold their keys, many believe that under
some encryption applications, particularly those involving stored
data, some users are interested in securing a means to recover
their encrypted data if they lose their own key. (We see less
incentive for development of key escrow for transmissions.) Market-based
efforts to address this problem -- responses to user needs --
are resulting in a range of "key escrow," "key
recovery," or "trusted third party" systems for
decryption assistance. These are quite different from the systems
proposed by the Administration under its legislative proposal,
which is voluntary in name only.
(6) Regardless of the use of encryption,
law enforcement will be able to satisfy many of its needs. In
many cases (e.g., suspects communicating with their banks or engaging
in credit card transactions, or other on-line commercial transactions)
there will be plaintext of messages and data readily available
to the government by subpoena or other legal process. In other
cases, the user-driven, user-controlled data-recovery or key escrow
procedures will satisfy the government's basic access needs for
stored data.
(7) If user-driven systems for key escrow,
data recovery or decryption assistance gain market acceptance,
government attempts to access such keys or decryption assistance
will raise important privacy interests. There is a need for legislation
setting clear privacy standards for government access to keys
and decryption assistance held by second or third parties, standards
that prohibit escrow agents from providing keys or decryption
assistance except in conformity with a court order issued upon
a finding of probable cause and a showing that there is no feasible
alternative of obtaining the plaintext, and requiring minimization
in the use of the key or assistance. (However, combining such
privacy protections with maintenance of export controls or with
other policies intended to coerce users to escrow their keys is
not a valid approach; it merely perpetuates the harmful policy.)
The Center for Democracy and Technology,
the coordinator of DPSWG, has organized a study of key escrow
by some of the world's leading authorities in encryption and computer
security. The purpose of the study is to examine the technical
and operational aspects of the Administration's proposal for "key
management." The report of the experts on their findings
has been issued and is available at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/.
By extending the privacy protections of
Title III to certain wireless telephone conversations with enactment
of ECPA in 1986, Congress sought to balance three goals: (1) to
provide strong legal protections for specified wireless communications,
(2) to afford law enforcement a carefully limited authority to
intercept wireless communications in serious cases, and (3) to
encourage the development and widespread availability of wireless
communications technologies. When it enacted ECPA, Congress knew
that it would have to return to the law of communications privacy
periodically, as technology continued changing. As we indicate
throughout this report, we are now, due to a series of developments,
at a juncture that requires a careful examination of the adequacy
of privacy protection legislation.
Some of these developments have occurred
in the realm of wireless communications: Wireless telephones have
become commonplace and are now widely used by more than 46 million
ordinary citizens. Moreover, wireless transmission is no longer
important only for voice communication, but is becoming increasingly
important for data transfer and as the gateway to the global information
infrastructure. Wireless modems, wireless faxes, wireless PBXs
(private branch exchanges, or switchboards), and wireless local
area networks are linking computers and transferring data that
could include proprietary information, medical records, and financial
data. Wireless links are becoming more and more important as access
points to the global information network.
In the network of networks that comprises
the telecommunications "system" of today and the future,
it is no longer appropriate to look at wireless telephone systems
as distinct from wireline systems or to look at the telephone
system as separate from the Internet. We are seeing a merger of
voice, data, and visual communication, carried interoperably over
both wireless and wireline channels.
In this context of a global communications
network increasingly dependent on wireless links, it is a serious
invasion of privacy to eavesdrop on wireless telephone conversations.
Wireless eavesdroppers are invading the privacy not only of the
person who is using a wireless phone, but also of anybody else
who is on the conversation using an ordinary landline telephone.
As wireless telephones become more ubiquitous, scanning threatens
the privacy of all telephone users.
In light of these developments, we have the following recommendations:
- The privacy protections of ECPA should
be extended unambiguously to wireless data transfers. At a time
when wireless local area networks are proliferating and wireless
data transmissions could be used for everything from proprietary
data to medical records, the law should be perfectly clear that
wireless data transfers are protected to the same extent as wireless
voice communications.
The status of legal protection for wireless data transfers has
a confused history, leaving it unclear whether they are currently
protected by ECPA. An earlier industry and privacy task force
concluded in 1991 that wireless transfers of data might not be
covered by ECPA, and recommended that coverage be extended.24
In 1994, in CALEA and with the support of the Administration,
Congress passed a provision making it clear that the privacy of
wireless data transfers was protected by ECPA. CALEA, Section
203, amending 18 U.S.C. 2510(16). But less than two years later,
in the anti-terrorism act of 1996, Congress repealed the provision
on the basis of the Justice Department's claim that the 1994 amendment
was inappropriately overbroad. Pub. L. 104-132, Section 731.25
Acceptable statutory language should be found to clear up the
confusion and make unambiguous the extension of ECPA to wireless
data.
- ECPA made it a crime to manufacture,
sell, assemble, possess or advertise any device that is "primarily
useful" for the interception of wireless telephone conversations.
18 U.S.C. 2512. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of this provision
is quite limited, since it is difficult to prove that a device
capable of intercepting cellular and a range of other frequencies
is "primarily useful" for prohibited interceptions.
Congress should consider deleting the word "primarily,"
at least as it affects manufacture, sale, assembly, and advertisement.
- The manufacture and import of scanners
equipped or readily alterable to receive transmissions in frequencies
assigned to the "domestic cellular radio telecommunications
service" are prohibited under Section 302(d) of the Communications
Act, 47 U.S.C. 302a(d). However, since the enactment of this provision,
a new category of services called "commercial mobile radio
services" has been created, into which cellular, as well
as additional mobile services at different frequency ranges, such
as personal communications systems (PCS), have been added. The
law does not appear to prohibit manufacture and import of devices
equipped to scan these frequencies. Congress should extend the
section 302 prohibition to the parts of the spectrum used for
PCS and other wireless telephone communications.
- Congress should also consider requiring
manufacturers to harden the electronics of scanners to make modification
harder and amending Section 302 to make it clear that "manufacture"
includes modification.
- Wireless telephone systems are developing
the capability to provide more refined location information on
wireless phone users. Nonconsensual government monitoring of location
through a wireless phone implicates privacy interests.26
Since wireless telephones are regularly carried into places where
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, Congress should
clarify the law by requiring a warrant based on a showing of probable
cause for nonconsensual governmental access to real-time wireless
telephone location information.
For the past quarter century, the law of
this nation regarding electronic surveillance has sought to balance
the interests of privacy and law enforcement. In 1968, the Senate
report on Title III stated explicitly that the legislation "has
as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances
and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications
may be authorized." As telecommunications technology continued
to change, Congress was again required to respond legislatively
to preserve the balance between privacy and law enforcement, by
enacting the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986. CALEA
again sought to preserve that balance, while adding to the balance
a third factor: supporting the development of new telecommunications
services and technologies.
Unfortunately, this balance among the interests
of law enforcement, privacy and technological innovation came
under challenge in the 104th Congress. As noted above, the Justice
Department sought and obtained repeal of one of the privacy protections
that were adopted in CALEA. In addition, the carefully crafted
procedures of FISA were made inapplicable to certain deportation
proceedings. Further, the President sought in his terrorism legislation
a series of other changes in the wiretap laws that would have:
(a) weakened the sanctions against illegal government wiretapping;
(b) weakened the standards for so-called "roving taps;"
and (c) expanded the availability of warrantless taps in "emergency"
situations. While these other changes were ultimately rejected,
they were considered and debated without attention to counterbalancing
proposals to enhance privacy.
The changes in the wiretap laws sought by
the Clinton Administration may be considered again in the 105th
Congress. In July 1996, the Department of Justice submitted to
Congress a report recommending 8 amendments to the federal electronic
surveillance laws, including a major change in the statute's exclusionary
rule, a loosening of the standard for "roving taps,"
and additional authority for emergency wiretaps without judicial
approval. The report stated that "several other proposed
amendments are under consideration by the Department, . . . [which]
are expected to be submitted to Congress at a later time."
Significantly, the Justice Department report
was able to identify only one revision to the wiretap laws that
would have enabled law enforcement authorities to better fulfill
their responsibilities. This was the addition of an additional
predicate offense for use of wiretapping, namely, 18 U.S.C. 842,
involving manufacturing, dealing in, and importing explosive materials
without a license and the unlawful distribution of explosive materials.
If amendments to the wiretap laws are to
be considered, then it must be in the context that gives equal
weight to an examination of issues from a privacy perspective,
including the adequacy of the minimization rule and the need to
clarify the requirement that law enforcement exhaust other techniques
before seeking an interception order.
1. Excusing Violations of the Wiretap Laws
The Administration has proposed amending
Title III to allow courts to receive evidence obtained in violation
of the law. Although sometimes described as a good faith exception,
the Administration proposal requires a person to prove "bad
faith" on the part of the government, a usually impossible
undertaking. The proposal is not limited to situations where law
enforcement officers relied on a technically defective warrant.
The proposal would apply to all of the provisions of the wiretap
law, including those governing the conduct of the government after
the warrant is issued. Thus, it would remove the only real incentive
against violating such central protections as the minimization
and evidence preservation rules. As noted above, the secretive,
on-going, and potentially general nature of electronic searches
make them problematic constitutionally, but it has been considered
that the special requirements imposed by Title III resolve any
Fourth Amendment doubts. The Administration proposal would render
those special statutory protections largely meaningless.
The justification for the Administration
proposal is unclear. The Supreme Court has already held that the
statutory suppression or exclusion rule in Title III is not to
be applied to technical violations. United States v. Giordano,
416 U.S. 505 (1974).
When Congress adopted Title III, it concluded
that the provision the Administration proposes to amend was "an
integral part of the system of limitations designed to protect
privacy." Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, S.
Rpt. no. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) at p. 96. The Administration
proposal would seriously undermine the protections against abuse
of the right to be protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
2. Roving Wiretaps
The Justice Department has proposed loosening
the standard for so-called roving or multi-point wiretaps. Roving
taps -- taps placed on a phone line other than the line subscribed
to by the target of a surveillance order -- are considered especially
sensitive because they often entail tapping the phone of someone
who is not the subject of an investigation and not suspected of
any involvement in criminal conduct. The Justice Department argues
that the current statute requires the government to show the subjective
intent of the subject to evade interception. The Department argues
that it should be enough that the subject's actions have the objective
result of thwarting interception. If Congress changes the standard
for roving taps, it should add to the law an explicit prohibition
against interception of the conversations of innocent third parties,
so that such conversations would be outside the scope of the warrant.
This conforms to stated Justice Department policy and the few
lower court decisions, but it would be desirable to write the
principle into the Title III statute.
3. Emergency Wiretaps
Title III allows the use of wiretapping
without court approval in emergency situations involving (i) immediate
danger of death or serious physical injury, (ii) threats to the
national security, or (iii) organized crime. In such cases, an
application for a court order must be filed within 48 hours. 18
U.S.C. 2518(7). The Administration has recommended expanding this
emergency authority to include terrorism cases that do not involve
an immediate danger of injury or threat to the national security.
More appropriate than the Administration's
proposed change would be a careful reexamination of the Title
III emergency exception itself. The emergency exception was enacted
in 1968. Now, given the pervasiveness of faxes, wireless telephones,
and e-mail, it is hard to understand why it would ever be impossible
or even difficult to reach a federal judge to obtain prior approval
for electronic surveillance. It should be noted that in 1977 the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended to allow for
telephonic submission of search warrant applications and affidavits
in emergency situations, with procedures for contemporaneous recording
of the oral testimony supporting probable cause. F. R. Crim. P.
41(c)(2). In addition, reference might be made to the emergency
procedures under FISA, 50 U.S.C. 1805(e), written in 1979, which
allow emergency taps for only 24 hours and require the notification
of a FISA judge at the same time that the emergency approval is
granted.
4. Review of FISA is Necessary
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., is unique in that there is usually never
any notice to the target of the surveillance, since the target
is never notified unless a criminal prosecution ensues, and never
therefore has an opportunity for after-the-fact adversarial review
of the legality of the taps. Even if there is a criminal investigation
and notice is provided, the adversarial hearing is inadequate
because the target is not allowed to see the affidavit that provided
the basis for the order. The increasing use of FISA intercepts
in criminal cases suggests that FISA is turning out to be a bigger
than expected exception to ordinary wiretap procedures. In espionage
cases involving U.S. persons, long after it is clear that the
subject is suspected of engaging in espionage, and long after
there is adequate basis to open a criminal case and obtain a wiretap
order under Title III, the FBI continues to proceed under a FISA
order, maintaining that the investigation serves a dual purpose
of counterintelligence and criminal investigation. This is directly
contrary to the intent of FISA.
The Internet is a global medium. One of
its great strengths is the ease with which it spans the globe:
information flows as effortlessly from New York to Nairobi as
from one building to another in Washington, DC. Moreover, a communication
from New York to Nairobi might travel through the United Kingdom
and five other countries one day, but through France and five
different countries the next. In this global context, it has been
said, the U.S. Bill of Rights is a local ordinance, meaning that
the U.S. constitutional guarantees (and the procedures of the
U.S. wiretap laws) offer no privacy protection against foreign
government interception of the communications of U.S. citizens
that cross national borders. Further, it has been held that the
U.S. wiretap statutes have no extraterritorial application. Congress
should determine what are the current Justice Department practices
and claims of authority in terms of electronic surveillance abroad
and the introduction in U.S. courts of electronic surveillance
evidence obtained abroad. Congress should consider applying the
court order requirements of Title III and FISA to interceptions
of communications by the U.S. government abroad for use in U.S.
criminal cases.
If commercial key escrow systems achieve
acceptance in the U.S., foreign governments are likely to seek
access to escrowed keys and decryption assistance, raising the
question of standards to be applied when a foreign government
seeks cooperation of U.S. authorities. A foreign request should
have to satisfy three criteria: the foreign government should
comply with the treaty and other standards normally governing
the provision of U.S. legal assistance to that government; the
foreign request should have to meet a standard at least as high
as domestic law enforcement agencies (in our view, a U.S. court
order based on a showing of legal authority to obtain the underlying
communication or data and specific need for the decryption assistance);
and standards should be in place that prohibit the disclosure
of keys or decryption assistance for political offenses or other
activity that would be protected under the U.S. First Amendment
or to foreign governments that do not adhere to minimum standards
of due process and privacy protection.
We note that U.S. government agencies, particularly
the FBI, have also been promoting the adoption of CALEA-type standards
on an international scale. In June 1993, the FBI hosted an international
conference on telecommunications interception at Quantico. In
1994, the "Barrett Commission" in Australia issued a
report entitled Review of the Long Term Cost Effectiveness of
Telecommunications Interception, which, noting the FBI's role,
supported the development of "international user requirements"
as the most effective means of "international cooperation
to ensure that law enforcement's needs are taken into account
in the development of new technology." In 1995, the Council
of the European Union adopted a set of interception requirements
for telecommunications systems, similar to the requirements developed
by the FBI, and urged Member States to implement the requirements
with respect to systems and service providers in their own countries.
Efforts were also undertaken to urge non-EU countries to adopt
the requirements. In 1996, the Telecommunications Standardization
Sector of the International Telecommunication Union was urged
by Australia to include the EU surveillance requirements in its
recommendations.
The DPSWG electronic surveillance task force
is currently examining international efforts, some undertaken
or supported by the U.S., that are underway to control encryption
technology, particularly through the promotion of trusted third
party key recovery systems that would allow for transnational
governmental access.
Notes
1
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), Katz v. U.S.
, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Back
2
18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. Back
3
As of December 31, 1995, forty jurisdictions (including the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) had laws on
the books authorizing wiretapping, while thirteen states (including,
e.g., Arkansas, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Tennessee) did not allow wiretapping by state and local police.
Every year, about half of the states that do authorize wiretapping
report not a single use of it by state and local law enforcement
agencies, according to the annual Wiretap Reports of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. In 1995, for example, over
half of the states that authorized wiretapping (22 out of 40)
did not utilize the technique (including, e.g., Illinois, Ohio,
Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin). Back
4
For example, the separation of telephone communications into a
signaling channel and call content channels can minimize the provision
of call content information to law enforcement agencies not authorized
to intercept call content. In the past, a law enforcement agency
conducting a pen register interception accessed the entire customer
line, including the content of conversations. Now, the carrier
can provide to law enforcement executing a pen register order
only the dialing information which law enforcement is authorized
to intercept. Back
5
ECPA in fact did not extend all of Title III's protections to
electronic communications. The court order authorizing the interception
of electronic communications can be based upon suspected violations
of any federal felony, rather than the limited list of crimes
that can serve as a predicate for telephone interceptions. In
addition, no statutory exclusionary rule applies to non-voice
interceptions that violate the procedures in the law. Back
6
"FBI budget justification for FY 1992," p. 67, reprinted
in "Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1992," Hearings before
a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 102nd
Cong., 1st Sess., part 2 (1991) at p. 738. Back
7
Testimony of Thomas E. Wheeler, President, Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association, "Digital Telephony and Law Enforcement
Access to Advanced Telecommunications Technologies and Services,"
Joint Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House
Judiciary Committee, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) ("Digital
Telephony Hearings") at 152. Back
8
In June 1996, the FCC adopted a Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in Docket 94-102, requiring wireless service
providers to modify their systems within 18 months to enable them
to relay to public safety authorities the cell site location of
911 callers. Further, the FCC ordered carriers to take steps
over the next 5 years to deploy the capability to provide latitude
and longitude information of wireless telephone callers within
125 meters. Finally, the FCC proposed requiring at the end of
the 5 year period that covered carriers have the capability to
locate a caller within a 40 foot radius for longitude, latitude
and altitude, thereby, for example, locating the caller within
a tall building.http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/Orders/1996/fcc96264.txt. Back
9
Testimony of Thomas E. Wheeler, "Digital Telephony Hearings,"
supra, at 152-54. Back
10
United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 139, 140, 663 (1992). Back
11
Jim McGee, "Military Seeks Balance in Delicate Mission: The
Drug War," Washington Post, Nov. 29, 1996, p. A1. Back
12
Richard A. Serrano, "Agencies Seek Update in Wireless Access,"
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 29, 1996. Back
13
Congress did intend in CALEA to raise the legal standard for access
to certain categories of information, including location information
that was already available in some systems and transactional data
associated with e-mail. Back
14
The FBI plan can be found at http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/CALEA_plan.html. Back
15
The matter arises as follows: A is the intercept subject. A
sets up a conference call with B and C using the conference call
capability provided by A's service provider. Then A puts B and
C on hold (or hangs up entirely) and calls D. The FBI is seeking
the delivery of both A's conversation with D and the conversation
between B and C. It is not clear that there is legal authority
to intercept the ongoing conversation between B and C after A
has hung up. Title III, embodying the Fourth Amendment standard
of particularity, requires the specification in the order of the
telephone facility to be tapped and the particular conversations
to be seized. The Supreme Court has held that conversations between
unknown individuals using a specified telephone line could be
lawfully intercepted under Title III. United States v. Kahn,
415 U.S. 143 (1973). And lower courts have upheld the roving
tap authority so long as it is limited to the interception only
of conversations of named subjects. No court has held that there
is authority to intercept the communications of unknown persons
using unspecified facilities. Back
16
"The Committee intends the assistance requirements in section
2602 to be both a floor and a ceiling. The FBI Director testified
that the legislation was intended to preserve the status quo,
that it was intended to provide law enforcement no more and no
less access to information than it had in the past. The Committee
urges against overbroad interpretation of the requirements. .
. . The Committee expects industry, law enforcement and the FCC
to narrowly interpret the requirements." "Telecommunications
Carrier Assistance to the Government," Report of the House
Judiciary Committee on H.R. 4922, Rept. 103-827, Part 1, 103rd
Cong., 2d Sess. (October 4, 1994), at pp. 22-23; "The Digital
Telephony Bill of 1994," Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
on S. 2375, Rept. 103-402, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) at pp.
22-23. http://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap/H_Rpt_103_827.txt [no longer available]. Back
17
CALEA is consistent with the general federal policy that requires
agencies to use technical standards developed by voluntary consensus
bodies whenever possible. National Technology Transfer Act, Sec.
12(d), Pub. L. 104-113. OMB guidelines prohibit agencies from
dominating industry standards proceedings. OMB Circular No. A-119. Back
18
"'We never planned to require the industry to meet capacity
requirements on a switch-by-switch basis," James Kallstrom,
head of the FBI office in New York said. 'That would be crazy.'"
John Markoff, "Dispute Arises over Proposal For Wiretaps,"
New York Times, February 15, 1997, p. 35. Back
19
The implementation plan says that systems engineering efforts
"are expected to begin in the second quarter of FY 1997."
The FBI must have meant second quarter of calendar 1997,
since the implementation plan was filed well into the second quarter
of the fiscal year and systems engineering had not yet begun. Back
20
Under standard conditions, a tap on a targeted phone does not
capture calls forwarded at the switch to another location. Back
21
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Information
Warfare-Defense (November 1996). The Task Force recommended spending $3 billion over the next
five years hardening the nation's telecommunications infrastructure
against attack, noting that the Defense Information Infrastructure
is largely dependent upon the commercial telecommunications system. Back
22
E.O. 13010 (July 15, 1996). http://pccip.gov [site on longer available; possibly refer to
http://www.nipc.gov/ Oct. 8, 1999]
The President created the Commission in response to threats that
include "computer-based attacks on the information or communications
components that control critical infrastrutures," such as
transportation, energy and water supply, and banking and finance. Back
23
It has also been argued that there is a First Amendment right to use and export encryption. Back
24
"Final Report of the Privacy and Technology Task Force Submitted
to Senator Patrick J. Leahy," reprinted in "Digital
Telephony Hearings," supra, at 179, 183. Back
25
The repeal came at the behest of the Justice Department, which
argued that the privacy provision was inappropriately overbroad,
and included ham radio and CB radio broadcasts, which should not
be privacy-protected. The Justice Department, reversing the Administration's
earlier provision, argued that wireless data transfers were already
protected. Rather than propose narrower language to make that
clear, the Administration successfully argued for repeal of the
entire provision. In the context of the many issues in the terrorism
bill, this one received little attention. Back
26
In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that the monitoring of a beeper in a private location
is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
The Court distinguished this from the use of a beeper to follow
an object being transported on the public roads, or to monitor
the general vicinity of an object, both of which had been held
not to implicate the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276 (1983). Obviously, wireless phones are carried by
their users into places where there is a legitimate expectation
of privacy. Wireless phone location tracking through the facilities
of service providers is becoming more precise, as a result of
the E911 requirements imposed by the FCC (see footnote 8 above),
and as a result of technical developments that are producing smaller
and smaller cell sites and cell sectors. If anything, monitoring
the location of wireless phones is more intrusive than the use
of a beeper. The beeper cases usually involve the attachment
of the beeper to an object (often contraband or precursor chemicals
for illegal drug manufacture). Unlike drums of precursor chemicals,
cellular phones are often directly associated with an individual
user. They implicate movements of the person going about his
or her daily life and entering a variety of locations (homes,
offices) where there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.
The ongoing nature of such monitoring (as opposed to the tracking
of a barrel of precursor chemicals from the manufacturer to the
clandestine laboratory in the typical beeper case) raises much
more serious privacy interests. These interests merit full Fourth
Amendment protection. Back
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